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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM
In response to changing technology and political climate, the U. S. Army has
adopted a method of warfighting called AirLand Battle Doctrine. This doctrine
describes the next battlefield to have indistinct battle lines and intense firepower
[Ref. l:pp. 1-1,1-2], The division between the front lines and the rear areas will be very
blurred as forces penetrate the forward edge of their opponent's defenses and attack
units behind the front lines. The doctrine proposes concepts and tenets that will
hopefully lead to success by Army units on this battlefield.
One of the basic tenets is depth. The commander must attack the enemy forces
not only in front of his forces, but the enemy forces that are supporting or are still not
committed [Ref. l:p. 2-2]. The successful attack of these forces will have benefits
beyond that of just destroying the force. Units in rear areas generally are in one of two
groups. They may be supporting the forces on the front lines, in which case their
destruction will have an impact across a broad front, or they may be in the reserve, as
yet uncommitted. The destruction of uncommitted units takes away alternatives of the
enemy commander. It follows that the Army must be able to identify those units whose
destruction will have the maximum benefit and attack them before others. The attack
of these units will disrupt the coherence of the enemy's organization and take the
initiative away from him [Ref. l:p. 2-1].
B. THE AIRLAND RESEARCH MODEL
As a way of evaluating AirLand Battle doctrine, a model called the AirLand
Research Model (ALARM) is under development at the Naval Postgraduate School.
The AirLand Research model is an effort to develop new methods of modeling warfare
on a large scale, to be used as a tool for evaluating the doctrine of the AirLand Battle.
The three primary purposes ofALARM are:
a. Develop modeling methodology for very large scale and sparsely populated rear
areas.
b. Use the methodology in wargaming/simulation with initial emphasis on
interdiction.
c. Perform research on AirLand Battle concepts. [Ref. 2:p. 2]
ALARM will initially be designed to be a systemic model (i.e., no man-in-
the-loop players). This creates the need for decisionmaking algorithms to perform the
roles of human players. Eventually, it is anticipated that an implementation with
human players will be developed.
The general setting for the initial ALARM model will be the Fifth U.S. Corps
area in Central Europe. One reason for this selection is that the general war in the
NATO area has been repeatedly studied and there is a strong consensus regarding the
outcome of certain 'textbook' scenarios. Secondly, while there is severe doubt that war
would ever occur in that area, little doubt exists that a war there would have a major
impact on the future shape of the world. Such a war would probably be of very short
duration, and the opportunity to recover from one's mistakes or to exploit the mistakes
of the other side would be very limited. The side that is best prepared, including having
the best doctrine, is most likely to prevail. Maving an operating model with which to
evaluate our doctrine is therefore a benefit to our Armed Forces.
One of the basic design concepts of the model is that all entities, whether they be
units, terrain, or man-made objects, will have comparable units of measure. In
formulating a plan for an attack of the opponent's rear area, a commander has to
decide which targets to attack. Any reasonable algorithm for making this decision will
demand that all targets be measured in comparable units. As the targets are likely to be
a heterogeneous mix of entities, having a common unit of measure is imperative. A
system to establish unit values in common metrics, called the Generalized Value
System, has been designed and initially tested for use in ALARM [Rcf. 3]. The
measure of a unit's capability is called its POWER. This is measured in Standard Units
of Power, or STAPOWS. The power of a unit in any two situations will likely not be
the same, so a method of computing a situationally-inherent power has been
formulated. There are many factors that go into this computation, such as the type of
support available to a unit, the mission it is assigned, the mission that it performs best,
and so forth. One of the traditional difficulties in determining the benefit of attacking
support units in rear areas has been the inability to determine their contribution to
combat units. The Generalized Value System includes the concept of derived power to
overcome this problem. A support unit derives its power from the power of the combat
units that it supports.
A second basic design feature concerns the ability to forecast events. In most
current models, the only information available to a decisionmaker is the current status
of the forces engaged. The information about the future state of any given entity is
noticeably absent. A conscious effort has been made in ALARM to establish
mathematical relationships that predict the state of any entity at any point in time.
This has made it possible to attempt the sort of decisionmaking envisioned in the
AirLand Battle doctrine. A commander can begin to make plans for the future because
he can forecast the status of every unit and can deal with situations that might result in
a lost war.
C. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
One of the difficult problems the commander must solve in implementing
AirLand Battle doctrine is determining which targets should be attacked because their
destruction provides the maximum benefit to his force. A further dimension to the
problem is deciding, once the targets are picked, which of his assets should be used to
prosecute the attack. In making this decision, he should consider units that can make a
successful attack, simultaneously suffering the least damage themselves. Still another
dimension of the problem is deciding when is the most opportune time to make the
attack. Time becomes a complicated problem because it must be considered both with
regard to the enemy forces and also to the friendly forces.
The goal of this thesis is to develop an algorithm that can determine what
asset-target assignments provide the maximum benefit to the friendly force. The
algorithm is designed specifically to consider artillery assets, but it has the potential to
be used with every type o[ asset that must be allocated to missions or targets in a
battle. The significant factors in the decisionmaking process are considered and are
converted to mathematical expressions for the algorithm. Rules for assigning standard
Field Artillery missions have been developed that use the output of an optimization
process to determine mission assignments. A number of optimization techniques are
considered. The continuous nature of the equations that describe a unit's power over
time, which are developed using the Generalized Value System and Lanchestcr
Attrition Processes, and the reality of fighting an enemy free to select his own optimal
strategy, led to the selection of the method of differential games as the optimizing tool.
This method is imbedded in a rule-based decision algorithm that utilizes user-selected
thresholds to select missions for artillery units. The rules reflect the commander's goals
of attaining a specified decrease in the enemy's power in a limited time window, while
minimizing the amount of power expended by his own units.
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D. OUTLINE FOR THE THESIS
The development of the algorithm to allocate assets to missions and targets will
begin by considering the methods used in current models to make asset allocations.
General optimization processes are outlined and their applicability to the Generalized
Value System is analyzed, and the method of differential games is selected as the
optimizing process. The process of making allocation decisions in actual practice and
what causes the process to be initiated is described. This description of the
decisionmaking process is converted to actual algorithm steps with the differential
game imbedded as the optimizer. The method of differential games is explained and
the equations used in this application are derived. An example of an artillery allocation
problem is outlined and the algorithm is used to solve it. Analysis of the results
suggests areas for further research.
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II. ALLOCATION DECISIONS IN MODELS
A. ALLOCATION IN CURRENT MODELS
The purpose of an allocation algorithm is to provide assistance to a
decisionmaker in assigning his assets to missions or targets. In some cases, there is very
little information available to the decisionmaker, so the number of choices reduces to
only a few, and the decisionmaker is able to discern the optimum without the aid of an
algorithm. In other cases, the choices themselves may be so limited that the solution is
obvious. An example of this is when there is only one asset to be allocated. The harder
cases, with several assets and numerous targets, as well as several factors that must be
considered in each case, are the ones that demand the help of an algorithm, and they
will be investigated further in this thesis.
Previous models have generally approached the problem of allocating assets to
targets by first establishing a set of prioritization rules for each asset type. For
example, artillery units might have one set of rules to determine which targets should
be attacked, while attack helicopter units have a different set. This method of
determining asset-target allocations worked as long as the process started with one
asset and multiple targets. The algorithm simply sorts the targets in order according to
the rules and breaks ties with some additional rule. The method is not so clear when
there are multiple assets and one target. Here it is not a case of sorting targets, but of
sorting assets to find the one that is best according to the decisionmaker's utility. The
rules for determining the optimal asset-target assignment that were used in the
preceding case cannot be used, and a new set must be formulated.
A second shortcoming of previous models has been their inability to make future
plans based on the forecasted future value of the targets. The strength and value of
entities is often based on a 'snapshot' of the battle, meaning an estimate at a given
instant of time. The best any model can do under this constraint is to give the current
state of the entities. Unless there exists a means of extrapolating forward in time, the
commander is forced to make his decisions based solely on this data. This is a
departure from actual practice where the past states of an entity can be considered
along with the current, and a projection into the future is made. An example of this
can be seen by considering a bridge, usually a critical entity on a battlefield. Assume
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that the bridge was made unusable by an air attack at time T,. An engineer unit is
dispatched to repair the bridge, and is in the process of doing so. A 'snapshot' of the
battlefield would show the bridge being unusable and would not credit it with being
partially repaired. Most models would not show that the bridge is gradually gaining
value and strength as the repairs progress, until it becomes a fully functional entity.
With the Generalized Value System and forecasting, the decision algorithm will be able
to consider the bridge and its value as a continuous function over time.
B. METHODS OF OBTAINING OPTIMAL ALLOCATIONS
There are several techniques that can be applied to provide an optimal solution
to the asset-target problem. The most basic method is to use linear or nonlinear
programming, depending on the formulation of the problem. One of the characteristics
of these methods is that they are essentially static. The modeler cannot specify
continuous time in his model. One way to get around this problem is to make time
discrete and solve the linear or nonlinear program for each discrete time period. A
further complication can arise if there are many strategies for the two sides to use. This
can lead to the specification of so many strategies that the programming solver is
overwhelmed.
A more sophisticated technique is optimal control theory. It has the advantage of
treating time continuously. It is different from other techniques in that it only
considers one side of the conflict to be a rational decisionmaker, while the opponent is
considered to follow a seT of predetermined courses of action. The opponent docs not
have the ability to alter his course of action during the game in response to the game
situation.
Another sophisticated technique is known as the method of differential games. It
also treats time continuously and has the advantage of allowing rational
decisionmakers on both sides of the conflict. Each side has an objective it is to achieve,
generally the opposite of the opponent's objective. This feature has appeal to the
military planner, who should be basing his plans on the enemy's capabilities until he is
certain of the enemy's intentions, which may not become apparent until it is too late to
react.
Optimal control theory and differential games offer attractive features that apply
to the allocation problem, and have been explored as tools to be used in solutions.
They both can handle the dynamic nature of combat, specifically the equations of
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Lanchester [Ref. 4:pp. 55-63] which will be used in ALARM. An extensive study of
differential games and their applications to military problems, particularly allocation
problems, has been conducted by James G. Taylor. [Ref. 5]
C. THE ALLOCATION DECISION PROCESS
1. Demand on the System
The underlying purpose of this algorithm is to assist a decisionmaker in
allocating his assets to a set of targets. To create a useful algorithm, it is important
that the context of the decision is understood. In actual practice in Army units, the
allocation of assets as part of a plan is driven by the perceived state of the friendly and
opposing forces. The details of the allocation are specified to create a 'win' for the
friendly forces, and consequently a loss for the opposition.
There are at least two decisionmakers involved in allocating the assets to
targets. The overall decisionmaker is the ground force commander. He is in charge of
the total ground combat force and is primarily responsible for the conduct of the
battle. The commander of the particular asset to be committed is the functional area
decisionmaker, such as a division artillery commander or an attack helicopter company
commander. He is given a mission or goal by the ground force commander and
determines what the optimal solution using his asset would be. To differentiate between
the two in the remainder of the paper, they will be referred to as the force commander
and the asset commander, respectively.
The~force commander perceives that on some parts of the battlefield, his
forces have the advantage over the enemy, and on other portions the enemy has the
advantage. In those situations where the enemy has the advantage and the force
commander has uncommitted assets available, the force commander should consider
the possible uses of the assets and how they can best benefit him. This is analogous in
a way to repairing a dike. If the reservoir is full and the engineer knows the stresses on
the dike, he can determine where to put the materials to strengthen the dike so that
they serve his needs best. A demand for the materials exists. Similarly, the force
commander perceives the demand on his uncommitted assets to strengthen the units
that are in a conflict they will lose.
2. The Decisionmaker's Objective
The demand must be expressed quantitatively for a mathematical algorithm to
assist in solving the problem. This raises the issue of assigning a number to the demand
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that makes actual sense. Each commander can probably arrive at a way of doing this,
but the method should be characterized by common sense and simplicity. Consider the
phrase 'optimal allocation'. In actual warfare use, an 'optimal allocation' is generally
the one that defeats the enemy with the smallest expenditure of resources. Defeating
the enemy is also a vague term. How is defeat expressed in numbers? A way of
looking at this is that a force commander, using the forecast of the power of his force
and the enemy force, decides that an enemy unit will have more power than one of his
units at some time in the future, as in Figure 2.1, and he wants to optimally allocate
his uncommitted assets to prevent that, or if he doesn't have enough assets available,
he wants to request more from his superior. The difference in power quantities at the
specified future time between his unit and the enemy's unit represents the difference
between losing the battle and preventing the enemy from achieving his goals. Simply,
if he has enough uncommitted assets and he allocates them to attack the enemy's units,
then the enemy will not have more power than his unit at the future time, and he can
assure at least a draw at that point in the battle. Further, by allocating his assets in an
optimal manner, he may have some uncommitted assets remaining in the future. These
could be allocated to deal with the actual situation as it becomes clearer. For the
purposes of an algorithm that is to be used to allocate artillery fires, the goal of the
asset commander will be to cause a decrease in the power of the opposing force to a
specified level.
3. Constraints
As with many optimization problems, there are constraints that must be
considered. First, the power of the forces on both sides is constrained to be
nonnegative. A unit can have zero power when it is destroyed, and it can have any
reasonable amount of positive power otherwise.
Second, each friendly artillery unit will be constrained in the amount and types
of ammunition available. Available ammunition includes the ammunition on hand in
the asset unit and ammunition that is in transit to the unit and will arrive before it is
needed. Indirect ammunition constraints will be imposed on the opposing forces. There
are not any ammunition counters for the opposing force, but with the concept of
derived power for supporting units it is possible to logistically constrain any unit
without actually counting quantities of ammunition or fuel.
A final constraint is that firing units may only attack those targets that are
within range of the weapon system. This constraint exists for obvious reasons.
15
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Figure 2.1 Graph of Blue and Red Power Curves.
D. INCORPORATING REALITY
The factors considered by an algorithm determine how closely it models reality.
This can be a two-edged sword. An algorithm that tries to consider every factor, not
just the important ones, is not responsive. It has as little value as one that does not
consider enough factors.
1. Decision Parameters
One factor that is essential to the solution of the problem is time. In almost
any real military problem, time is a scarce resource. In this problem, the force
commander recognizes that at a specified time in the future, one or more of his units
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will be 'overpowered' by the enemy. He desires to take action between now and that
future time to prevent that outcome. The asset commander must therefore either
decrease the enemy's power in the timeframe imposed or report that he cannot, in
which case it is envisioned that the force commander would look for another asset to
perform the mission or request assistance from his superior. Another alternative for
the force commander is to combine the attacks of two or more uncommitted assets to
accomplish the mission. This alternative is more indicative of how this problem is
addressed in reality, particularly in AirLand Battle doctrine, where simultaneous or
sequential attacks by different types of forces that have complementary attributes is
considered to be more powerful than an attack by only one force.
A second factor to be considered is the enemy's power and how it is changing
over time. With the Generalized Value System, it is possible to model the military
intelligence section estimates of the status of enemy units and forecast their power in
the future. Implied in that process is a judgement about the way the enemy's power is
changing over time. It may be decreasing as he consumes supplies or increasing as he
approaches the time and place where he begins to accomplish his mission. Also, by
making similar judgements about the state of the enemy's logistics, power changes due
to resupply or generally increased support may be indicated. Knowing this would give
the asset commander the option of attacking a logistics unit, a target that may be
easier to destroy and much less likely to return fire. This would be an indirect means of
reducing an enemy unit's power. This is all important information for a decisionmaker,
who should be looking for the time and place that gives the greatest payoff for using
his asset's power. An optimal allocation of power can be found by finding those times
and places, and attacking them in sequence.
Every attack carries an implied risk to the attacker. For an artillery unit about
to fire for the first time on a target, part of the payoff for making the attack is the
negative return of disclosing the artillery unit's position and creating the possibility
that the enemy will detect it and return fire, with the resultant decrease in the power of
the artillery unit. This possibility increases with time (i.e., as the artillery unit fires more
rounds at the enemy unit, the more opportunity there is for the enemy to detect the
exact location of the artillery unit). If the enemy returns fire accurately, the attacking
unit will inevitably sustain losses of equipment and personnel. These losses will be
called 'permanent' losses, and of course there will be the complementary 'temporary'
losses.
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Temporary losses will include those that can be replaced in a short amount of
time. The most common example of a temporary loss is the expenditure of
ammunition. This is a loss that is anticipated and replacement ammunition is pushed
forward by the logistics system from the first day of conflict. Units are expected to
expend ammunition and fuel. Permanent losses, on the other hand, cannot be replaced
as readily. Their occurrence may be anticipated, as casualties certainly are, but
replacements are generally 'pulled' through the logistics system. Damaged or destroyed
vehicles and other forms of equipment are good examples of 'permanent' losses.
Both permanent and temporary losses are important factors in the allocation
decision because they will occur, and one of the stipulations on the asset commander is
that he minimize the asset power used. There is often a strong relationship between
the amount of time a unit is firing, thereby exposing its position, and the amount of
damage it receives from counterfire. Minimizing firing time is a way to avoid a large
amount of power lost due to enemy fire. One way to minimize firing time is to fire the
ammunition that gives the maximum attrition of the enemy power per round fired.
Temporary and permanent losses represent power losses to the asset commander, so he
is very concerned about them. They are separated, though, because temporary power
losses may be regained in time to execute other missions with some certainty. Since
they are planned for, the military planner can expect replacements in a short time. The
same cannot be said for permanent replacements.
Two real measurements also influence the asset decisionmaker. First, he can
only attack targets that are within range of the assets he controls. Second, as
previously discussed, he may only fire the types and amounts of ammunition that are
in the unit's possession or are in a resupply convoy that is available to the unit before
the ammunition is to be fired.
Finally, the asset decisionmaker must consider the need to attack targets that
have an overriding priority. It is fairly common practice to establish a set of targets
whose destruction is of benefit to the entire force, and therefore these targets are
accorded a very high priority. An example of this might be a nuclear-capable missile
battery or a radio-jammer. The nuclear-capable missile battery may only represent a
fraction of the power of a tank regiment, but its potential for inflicting severe damage
in a very short period of time makes it a target of immense importance.
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2. Artillery Missions
Without going into a lengthy discussion of the Field Artillery and the way it is
tactically employed, a short explanation of the subject is necessary for understanding
the algorithm. This discussion will cover the missions artillery units are given, the
general rules used in determining what missions are assigned, and a brief example of
how they will be modelled in the algorithm.
There are four standard missions that may be given to a field artillery unit.
They are Direct Support, Reinforcing, General Support-Reinforcing, and General
Support. The actual differences between each of the misssions can be found in U.S.
Army Field Manual 6-20, Fire Support in Combined Arms Operations. Direct Support
is the relationship that usually exists between an artillery battalion or brigade and a
maneuver brigade. It implies that the first and primary responsibility of the artillery
unit is to support the maneuver brigade. Reinforcing is a mission that can be given to a
field artillery unit when that unit is to provide primary support to another field artillery
unit, which is itself in direct support of a maneuver brigade. General Support is the
mission given when a unit is to provide support to the entire organization, not just a
portion. This commonly occurs at the level of Division or Corps. An artillery unit
might be given the mission of General Support to the Division, meaning it provides
support to every brigade, not just a specific one. Finally, General Support-Reinforcing
is a mix of the two preceding missions. A unit with this mission provides primarily
general support to the entire organization, but secondarily provides reinforcing fires to
a specific field artillery unit in direct support to a maneuver brigade. [Rcf. 6:p. C-7]
A set of rules or guidelines exist in the Field Manual cited that arc used to
determine mission assignments. As a rule, missions are assigned to artillery battalions
or brigades, and the subordinate units have the same mission as the parent unit unless
otherwise specified. The first mission assignment rule is to maintain the maximum
feasible central control. Artillery is most effective when it attacks in mass, and
centralizing control facilitates such attacks. The second mission assignment rule is that
a field artillery unit will be assigned in direct support to each committed maneuver
brigade. If a brigade is not committed, it will not have any direct support artillery until
it is committed. The third rule is to weight the main avenue of attack (in the offense)
or the most threatened sector (in the defense). This is normally done by assigning a
mission of Reinforcing or General Support- Reinforcing to one or more units. The
fourth rule is to assign missions to facilitate future operations. The fifth rule is to keep
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some artillery available to the force commander to influence the battle. This is
generally accomplished by assigning one or more units a General Support or General
Support-Reinforcing mission. The final rule is to keep no artillery units in reserve.
[Ref. 6:pp. C-10-12]
The way the algorithm will assist in mission assignments is by solving a
differential game to determine the optimal allocation of assets to targets, then assigning
missions based on thresholds. These thresholds might be time-specific or
power-specific. For example, the algorithm first assigns a Field Artillery battalion in
direct support of each maneuver brigade. Then it solves the game and returns the
solution that specifies what artillery units fired what targets over the time span of
interest. If an uncommitted unit fired for more than a specific percentage of time, say
50%, at targets in the First Brigade sector, then it would be assigned the mission of
Reinforcing the direct support battalion assigned to the First Brigade. Or if a unit fired
at targets in each sector in basically equal amounts, it would be assigned the mission of
General Support. The specific thresholds and percentages used in the algorithm should
be provided by the user.
With an understanding of the techniques available for solving an allocation
process and the framework and factors of the decision process, the next step is to
develop the algorithm and explain the tools used in it.
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III. ALGORITHM DEVELOPMENT
The development of an algorithm to resolve the optimal allocation problem
requires that the decisionmaking objectives, constraints, and factors be translated into
algorithm steps in a simple yet complete form. It also requires that a technique of
solving allocation problems be selected and implemented. The technique that will be
used is the method of differential games, as described in Chapter 2, Section B.
A. DEVELOPMENT OF ALGORITHM STEPS
The need for this algorithm arises when the force commander determines that a
demand exists for the use of his uncommitted assets. Because ALARM uses standard
units of power (STAPOWS) as a measure of a unit's strength, this demand should
assume the form of "decrease the enemy force by AY STAPOWS". Since the force
commander projects the enemy's power and his own force's power forward in time to
determine the amount of power decrease required, he will specify a time by which the
decrease in power must be accomplished. Given the current state of the various forces,
the power decrease must be completed by a specified future time in order for the force
commander's objective to be satisfied.
1. Inputs to the Algorithm
The first step in the algorithm is to acquire the information needed to make
the allocation decision. The asset commander who makes the decision first receives the
mission from the force commander.
"Decrease the enemy's force at time, t^ (the future time) by A Y STAPOWS."
This statement contains the first two inputs to the algorithm. One is the required
power decrease in the enemy force, and the second is the time by when the power
decrease is necessary.
A further set of inputs is the power level of each of the units involved in the
allocation decision as either assets or targets. These power levels are available through
the Generalized Value System for both the current time and the end of the timeframe,
tr, under consideration.
There are several other items of information that are needed to solve the
algorithm. Their uses will be explained in greater detail as the algorithm is developed.
They include:
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• the current locations of the units involved in the allocation as. either assets or
targets, and their direction and rate of movement if they are moving;
• the maximum range of each unit's weapons;
• the amounts and types of ammunition in each unit's possession;
• attrition rates for each ammunition-target and asset- target combination;
• the fraction of total power that is represented by the ammunition on hand in
each friendly unit;
• the number of firing systems available in each friendly unit;
• the rate of fire for the weapon system in each friendly unit.
2. Feasibility Checks
The first step in allocating assets to targets is to eliminate from consideration
those targets that are beyond the maximum range of a unit's weapons. The information
needed for this step is the current positions of every asset and target, the direction and
rate of movement if a unit is moving, and the maximum range of each unit's weapons.
If a target is beyond the range of a unit's weapons, the attrition coefficient for that
asset-target combination is set to zero. This will result in the pair being nonoptimal in
the differential game. This step can be repeated after each time period.
A second feasibility check applies to ammunition selection for firing. The
attrition coefficient, a- which is the attrition rate of enemy target j when fired on by
friendly unit i, is linked to the type of ammunition fired by unit i. For example, if unit
1 fires a high explosive round against an enemy tank unit 2, a,
2
might be 0.02. If a
precision guided round were fired, a
12
might be 0.1.
Ammunition selection for each Blue artillery unit will be constrained to the
ammunition that is actually in the unit's possession in the algorithm. A full model may
consider not only the ammunition on hand, but also the ammunition that is being sent
to the unit. Because the algorithm is being demonstrated in a limited scenario, the full
logistical package necessary to represent the resupply of ammunition is not yet
available. In the future, ammunition resupply to the Blue forces will be considered.
The algorithm will calculate the amount of ammunition necessary for all
weapon systems to fire at a specified rate of fire in the next time period. This will be
checked against the amount on hand for each ammunition type, and those that do not
exist in sufficient quantities will not be considered for firing. For example, artillery unit
X
2
has twenty-four (24) howitzers available and an individual howitzer fires at a rate of
one-half (.5) of a round per minute. The formula
Ammo required = (rate of fire per system)*(number of systems)*time period
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is applied with the result that twelve (12) rounds are needed in unit X
2
for every
minute of firing. The. ammunition quantities in X
2
are checked against this amount
required, and any type that is not on hand in the amount required is eliminated from
consideration by setting a.y t0 zero.
3. Determining Attrition Coefficients
There is no mechanism in the algorithm for counting the quantity of
ammunition expended by the enemy units. The power of the ammunition they use is
accounted for by the derived power of their logistics units. The attrition coefficients 0--
are based solely on the firer-target combinations. The type of ammunition fired is not
considered.
For Blue units the rate at which Red targets are attrited is linked to the
ammunition fired against the target. This is a natural linkage, since artillery units
damage or destroy enemy forces by delivering indirect fires to the target. Different
types of ammunition have differing effectiveness against the same target, as has already
been shown, and tables are used in manual or automated ammunition selection to find
the best combination. The general rule of thumb is to select the ammunition that has
the highest effectiveness. This is closely related to selecting the ammunition that has
the highest attrition rate.
The method the algorithm uses to find the attrition coefficient for the Blue
unit is to select, from the ammunition types that are on hand in the required quantity,
the ammunition type that has the maximum attrition rate. There are two justifications
for this selection rule. First, depending on the firer's motivation, this ammunition type
will give the maximum attrition over a fixed time interval, or it will require the shortest
firing time to attain a specified amount of attrition. The Blue asset commander, for
reasons explained in Chapter 2, Section D, Subsection 1, will endeavor to minimize
firing time, so he wants to select the ammunition that provides the maximum attrition
rate. Secondly, the method used in the algorithm for determining which asset-target
allocations are optimal requires that the maximum value of a product whose terms
include a- be found. To insure that this occurs, the value of a- should be a maximum.
4. Determining Power Loss Due to Ammunition Expenditure
The next step in the algorithm is to determine the optimal asset-target
allocation. The method for doing this is part of the explanation of the technique of
differential games, explained later in this chapter. For now, assume that the optimal
asset-target combinations have been specified.
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Once the best asset-target combinations have been selected, the ammunition
that each asset will fire is determined. In the preceding steps, the best ammunition each
asset should fire on every possible target was determined. Now that the actual target is
known, the calculation for power lost due to ammunition expenditure in a time period
is given by:
Power Loss = (power of one round of type k)*(number of rounds fired in time
period)
One of the inputs to the algorithm is the fraction of total power of each Blue
unit that the ammunition on hand represents. The power that the total amount of
each type k ammunition represents is proportional to the ratio of the type k
ammunition quantity to the total ammunition quantity, multiplied by a constant that
represents the value of the type k ammunition relative to all other types.
Total power of ammunition type k = (Total ammunition power)*(Quantity of type
k ammunition)*( Relative Wcight)/(Total ammunition quantity)
The unit of measure of total power of type k ammunition is STAPOWs. The power in
each round is found by dividing the power of the type k ammunition by the number of
rounds of type k ammunition. This will result in an equal division of power to each
round in the same ammunition type.
After this step in the algorithm, book-keeping steps are taken to update the
total ammunition on hand, the total amount on hand in each type, and the power of
the ammunition remaining. This update is done to ensure that the planned solution
remains within the feasible limits for ammunition.
5. Determining Optimal Allocations
All of the information required to formulate the differential game is now
available. The procedures for solving the game will be presented in detail in Section B.
The game will specify as output what asset-target allocations are optimal. Since these
allocations are expected to change as time progresses, the output will specify when the
changes occur and what the new combinations are after the change.
6. Mission Assignments
The final step in the algorithm is to assign missions to uncommitted units. In
solving the problem for an artillery decisionmaker, the algorithm compares the time or
the power, at the user's direction, spent by each asset engaging targets in the
threatened sector with the threshold parameters. It assigns missions to the unit when it
exceeds the mission threshold.
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In the event that the power available in the uncommitted assets is not
sufficient to attain the goal of Red power decrease specified, the algorithm returns a
result that states this fact. Figure 3.1 is a concise representation of the algorithm.
B. USING A DIFFERENTIAL GAME TO FIND OPTIMAL ALLOCATIONS
The core of the algorithm is the differential game that is used to determine the
optimal allocations. There are two features of ALARM that lead to the selection of
this technique. First, the power functions of the Generalized Value System and the
equations of dynamic combat developed by Lanchester lead to the consideration of an
entity's power as a continuous function over time. It seems logical that the method of
allocating assets to targets should take advantage of the continuous nature of these
functions. Linear and nonlinear programming do not. Secondly, the nature of warfare
is such that both the Blue and Red commanders are striving to attain their objectives
and are not locked into a predetermined strategy. They can both make decisions about
allocating their resources in response to their opponent. The theory of optimal control
only allows one of the decisionmakers to react to the opponent. A differential game
incorporates these desirable features.
1. Power Equations
Every entity involved in the allocation decision is represented in the algorithm.
There are a set of Blue units, represented by X,, X
2
,..., Xm , and a set of Red units,
represented by Y,,Y
2
,..., Y . The Blue units are the assets to be allocated, and the Red
units are the potential targets. Other entities may be represented, such as bridges,
airfields, or cities. They will be included as assets if they contribute to Blue power, or
targets if they contribute to Red power. The variable Xj (or Y:) represents both the
identification of the entity and the power it possesses.
The power of every entity can be expressed as a function of time according to
the equations developed in the Generalized Value System. In this system, there are
several types of power, the definitions for which are in Appendix 2. The power used in
the algorithm is the Situational Inherent Power, defined to be ". . . the prediction, at
time t of the inherent power that an entity Xj will have at time t, given the state of
the entity at t SX. (t ); t < t." [Ref. 3J. The present time, or the time the
P> * P P
prediction is made, is t . The time that the prediction applies to is t. There is a third
time that is important, because it is the time when the unit reaches the maximum



























Figure 3.1 Allocation Algorithm.
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(The mnemonic PABIP stands for Predicted Adjusted Basic Inherent Power and is
defined in Appendix 2.) The term Dj represents the rate at which the unit is attaining
readiness as it approaches the time and place when it attains maximum power. It is
somewhat analogous to a discounting factor [Ref. 3:p. 38]. Using equation 3.1, the
power of an entity as it approaches the time and place where its mission begins can be
determined.
The other process that determines the way an entity's power changes over
time is attrition due to combat. The algorithm uses the equations of attrition developed
by F. W. Lanchester [Ref. 4:pp. 52-60J. Since it is solving the problem of allocating
artillery fires, the Linear Law formula is used in the algorithm. This implies that each
side fires into an area, instead of employing aimed fire. This is acceptable unless the
artillery is firing ammunition that receives guidance to a specific target by some means,
such as Copperhead or the proposed SADARM projectiles. In that case, a Square Law
formula seems more appropriate. A likely compromise on this in a future application
could be the Helmbold equations [Ref. 4:p. 175]. At this time, the algorithm does not
include provisions for such ammunition.
The Lanchester Linear Law equation for a Blue entity, X-, opposed by Red
entities, Y:, is:
dXj/dt = -£" (P ii*Xi*Y:) (eqn 3.3)j=i J J
A similar equation can be developed for every entity in both forces.
The equation for the total change in power of an entity is a combination of
Equations 3.1 and 3.3. The solution mechanism requires a differential equation to
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express the power of every entity, so the Situational Inherent Power equation is






























This can be combined with the Lanchester equations 3.3 to obtain the following

































As was mentioned in Section 1 of this chapter, the algorithm also determines
the power loss due to the expenditure of ammunition by each Blue unit. This quantity
is determined by computing the power represented by a single round of ammunition
and multiplying that quantity by the number of rounds fired in a time period. This
product is calculated for each ammunition type fired and the products are summed,
resulting in the power loss due to ammunition expenditure in the time period:
^ k
Power Loss = -> aifn l ( ecln 3-8)
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where a-j is the power of one round of type 1 in unit i, and nj is the number of rounds
fired in the time period.






















Equations 3.9 and 3.7 for dXj/dt and dY:/dt represent the change in the state variables
X- and Y: as the battle progresses in time. The purpose of the algorithm is to
determine when Blue units should fire at Red targets, and what targets should be
engaged, so the required attrition occurs while minimizing the power expended by the
Blue units. As equations 3.9 and 3.7 (known as Kinematic equations) now stand, there
is no means for Blue to selectively fire at Red, or Red at Blue.
The means for doing this is to introduce control variables. Blue will indicate
selection by the value of the control variable <p and Red will indicate selection by the
value of the control variable \j/. The value of (p- will determine when Red unit j is
selected as a target for Blue unit i and the opposite meaning holds for \\i--. In practice
the subordinates of each Blue or Red unit will have the same mission or target as the
parent unit. If the Blue artillery battalion is firing on a target, the entire battalion will
be firing on it, not a fraction of it. The only exception to this is when one of the Blue
batteries is moving. The algorithm will ignore this exception, since it is involved in
planning and not actual execution. The possible values of (p- and \j/:j will be zero or
one.











































2. The Terminal Condition
If the differential game starts at the current time, which is tQ , it will progress
by means of the Kinematic equations until it reaches the desired terminal conditions.
In this algorithm, the terminal conditions are bounded by the constraints that the Blue
and Red units have nonnegative power quantities and t must be greater than tQ . With
the Blue goal of decreasing the power of the Red forces by a specific amount, an
additional terminal condition is that Red's final power must be less than or equal to
the maximum allowable amount. Since there is a time limit on achieving the attrition,
the condition that the game must end by a specified time also exists. Figure 3.2 is a
general depiction of the surface of the game in two dimensions, showing the Red force
power decrease and the time of the game.
Figure 3.2 depicts the power of the Red force from tQ to tp Y(tj-) is the maximum
allowable power of the Red force at tp In general, there are some points Y(tQ ) from
which it is possible to decrease Red's power to Y(t>) at or before t^ , and there are
some points Y(tQ ) for which it is not possible to attain Y(tr) at or before tf . For the
Blue asset commander, this equates to a difference between attaining the required
power decrease in the specified time or not attaining it.
3. The Payoff of the Game
Differential games are solved recursively, so the terminal conditions will
become the initial conditions for the algorithm. The constraint on time is removed, and
the payoff to each side will be the time required for Blue to cause the desired attrition
to Red. The Blue commander wants to minimize the time needed to reduce Red's
power to the necessary level. Red, on the other hand, wants to maximize the time
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Figure 3.2 Terminal Surface.
4. Strategy and Value
In game theory the term 'strategy' means the decision that the player makes at
each point in the game about how he will play [Ref. 7:p. 36]. For this problem, the
decision to be made is whether to attack each of the possible targets. Blue indicates his
strategy by setting <p to 1 if he will attack, or to otherwise. Red makes the same
choices on \j/ . At the end of the battle, the strategy for the whole battle will be the set
of (p and \\f values chosen. It is expected that (p- and \\t- will change during the course
of the battle. The restriction is imposed that a firing unit may only fire on one target at
a time. After the initial targets are selected, the optimal solution may include changing
targets to get a better payoff. The time that the shift occurs and the shift itself are
important to the asset commander. The entire set of allocations and the times that the
allocations change comprise the strategy for each side over the whole battle.
The value of the game, or battle, occurs when Blue and Red both achieve the
payoff they desire. The value for Blue is the minimum time to attain the attrition,
regardless of Red's attempts to delay it. For Red it is the maximum time to attain the
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attrition, regardless of Blue's attempts to hasten it. For each entity in the game, a value
exists, and is denoted V(X-) or V(Y:). Because the payoff is dependent on the strategy
each player uses, the expression for the Value is :
V(Xj) = V(Y:)=min
(p
max^ (Payoff) (eqn 3.13)
[Ref. 7:p. 36]. Hereafter, references to the Value of the game will use an uppercase V,
and references to the value of all other quantities will use a lowercase v.
5. The Main Equation
Let all of the state variables be represented by the vector X. With the state
variables known at t
Q ,
it is possible to advance in time by At and determine the new
value of the state variables, given by:
X(t + At) = X(tQ)-f (dX/dt)*At = X + A X (eqn 3.14)
The Value of the game at this point is:
V(X(At)) = J
V dt = At. (eqn 3.15)
The game begins again with the new values of the state variables, and with both
players using their optimal strategy. At the end of the game the total payoff will be:
V(X)= \t+ V(XQ + \X) (eqn 3.16)
and it can be shown that :
V(X
Q + A X) = V(X ) + £id V(X)/d Xj*A X { (eqn 3.17)
= V(X )+ £i(d V(X)fd Xi)*(dXi/dt)*At.
If. the players use the optimal control variables in the first At of the game, then the
total payoff of the game would be:
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V(X) = At + V(XQ ) + Y.{(d V(JQ/5 Xi)*(dXi/dt)*At (eqn 3.18)
Both sides of Equation 3.18 are divided by At and as the size of At approaches 0,
Equation 3.18 reduces to:
= 1+ £i (3 V(X)/a XjHdXj/dt) (eqn 3.19)
which is equivalent to:
minq) max^ {1 + J\ (d V(X)/d X^^dXj/dt)} = 0. (eqn 3.20)
Equations 3.19 and 3.20 are known as the Main Equation [Ref. 8:pp. 101-102].
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= d V(X)/d Xj (eqn 3.22)








q = Y aifn i . (eqn 3,26)






















or,rearranging to group terms with the control variables present and multiplying by -1,
an equivalent form is:
EiVi*[Bi*((exp(-D i*(ta-t)))*Di) + q] + minM,(£jYj*£iVi (eqn 3.28)
*¥ji*Pj i*Xi)+2:jWj*[Rj*(exp(-Dj*(ta-t)))*Dj] +
max^diX^CW^cp^a^Yp) = 1
Considering only the final term of Equation 3.28, the way to obtain the
maximum value for that quantity subject to the constraint that <p- = or 1 is to find J
such that W:*a-j*Y: is a maximum, and make <p- = 1 for that J. The same idea holds
for the second term in the left-hand side. For each j, find the i value for which
Vj*Pji*X- is the minimum, and set \\i-- = 1 for that /'.
The algorithm thus has a rule for setting the control variables for both
players. The values of a- and 0:- are known inputs, and the values for each X- and Y:
can be found, at every point in time, by integrating the expressions for dXj/dt and
dY:/dt. That leaves the issue of determining the values of V- and W:.
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6. The Path Equations
Recall the Main Equation:
1 + £i(d V(X)/3 Xi)*(dXi/dt)=0 (eqn 3.29)
If the left-hand side of Equation 3.29 is differentiated with respect to X:, j ¥= i, the
result is the sum:
did XjCEj (d V(X)/B X i)*dX i/dt) = (eqn 3.30)
Applying the Chain Rule, this becomes:
£j (^(Ayax^aXjrCdXj/dt) (eqn 3.31)
+ j\ (avw/ax^/a^dXi/dt))
+Ik a/ao(i+s i (5vw/ax i)







where O and ¥ denote the vectors of control variables (q)j,(p2,...,(pm) and
(\j/i,\|/2»---.V n )- The last two terms vanish because the control variables are constrained





d®/dX- = (eqn 3.33)
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There are no modifications to the second term of Equation 3.31, but there is a simpler
expression for the first term. It is:
£j( d 2\{X)ldX{dX^X{ldX (eqn 3.34)
=i; i5/ax 1(avw/ax 1)*dx i/dt
= d/dt(dV(*)/5Xp
Equation 3.31 can now be written:




When the X in the denominator of the differential operator of Equation 3.35 is
replaced by X- and Y:, Equation 3.35 becomes two equations, one for dV-/dt and
























/dt))-^_" Wj (eqn 3.37)
*a/aYj(dY^dt)














(dXk/dt)=-Pj*k*yj*k*Yj*, for i = k. (eqn 3.40)



















d/3Yj(dYj/dt)= { 0, if j * 1 (eqn 3.43)
{-I^fcp^Xj, forj = l
*
As before, (p- = for all i except i = i that results in a maximum for Wj*aj-*Y:, and
the second derivative is then reduced to:
a/dYjCdY^'dt) =
-4^*1*9j*] *Xi*J for j = 1. (eqn 3.44)
With these reduced expressions substituted into Equations 3.36 and 3.37, and
with the previously defined Kinematic equations, there are 2(m+n) differential
equations that describe both the Value of the game to units and the state of each unit
as time advances. These equations, with the initial values of the 2(m+n) variables, can
be solved simultaneously to find the formal solution of the differential game and the
other information the commander needs to make the allocation decisions. [Ref. 8:pp.
102-103].
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7. The Initial Conditions
Differential games are very similar to dynamic programs. If the differential
equations are approximated by discrete values in very small sub-intervals of the paths
the equations follow, the result would be a discrete game that could be solved by a
dynamic program. The values of the state variables X- and Y: are known at the start,
and Y: is known at the end. The values of V- and \Y- are not known at the start, but it
is possible to find them at the end. If the algorithm started at tQ , it is theoretically
possible to enumerate every combination of strategies and resultant variable values, but
computationally impractical. As with its discrete cousin, dynamic programming, the
approach to solving the differential game is to begin at the end, at time tf . [Ref. 7:p.
81].
An adjustment that is necessary to start the solution at the end, or the
terminal condition, is to reverse time. When moving from the terminal surface toward
the initial surface, the symbol t is used to denote the time interval from the terminal
surface to the current position. Figure 3.3 demonstrates this.
Figure 3.3 Time Scale.
The path equations, derivatives with respect to t, must also be adjusted. They
are modified by changing their sign, as in:
dXi/dx = -dXi/dt (eqn 3.45)
The final preparation is to specify the initial value of the variables, but now the initial
value means the value at the terminal surface.
The values of the state variables Y: are known. They are determined by the
inputs specified by the force commander. The values of X- on the terminal surface are
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unknown, but they can be any arbitrary positive value. The asset commander is
interested in minimizing the power expended, so the quantity of interest is:
XjCt^-XjCtf) (eqn 3.46)
the amount of power expended. This quantity can be determined at the end of the
game.
The values of V- and W- at t^ must be determined. They can be found based
on the nature of the game and the given information. The term:
Vj = d V/d Xj (eqn 3.47)
evaluated at the terminal condition, t = tr(or z = 0), equals 0. In other words, at the
terminal surface, when Blue has either achieved the decrease in Red's power or has run
out of time to achieve it, there is no change in the Value of the game if another
increment of Blue power available.
The term:
W: = 3 V/d Y: (eqn 3.48)
evaluated at the terminal condition equals:
-l/E,<«ij*Xi*Yj**ij) ( etin 3 -49 >
The presence of an additional increment of Y: at the end of the game translates to a
change in the amount of time required for Blue to achieve the required attrition of Red
power. Since the Value of the game is a function of this amount of time, it will be
directly altered by the presence of the additional increment of Y:. The reciprocal of the
Lanchester attrition equation dY:/dt is the change in time with respect to Y:, and the
Value of the game is the amount of time required for Blue to decrease Red power, so
this reciprocal is the value of W(0).
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IV. APPLICATION OF THE ALLOCATION ALGORITHM
The motivation to develop the algorithm is to provide an allocation process for
Field Artillery battalions in ALARM, so it will be demonstrated in that context. The
general scenario will be explained and the allocations determined by the algorithm will
be analyzed in this chapter.
A. THE GENERAL SCENARIO
The scenario has a U.S. brigade defending against an attacking WARSAW
PACT motorized rifle division. The brigade, the Blue force, will be able to defend
successfully if it can maintain a power ratio of 1:3 with the WARSAW PACT division,
the Red force. The forecast of the power curves of the Blue brigade and the Red
division is shown in Figure 4.1. The power curve of the Red division crosses the power
curve of the Blue brigade at time 60. The power curve of the brigade has already been
multiplied by three (3) to account for the ratio being considered. After time 60 the
brigade will be in an infeasible situation.
The brigade, a component of a Blue division, must receive support from the
division in the form of additional combat power if the 1:3 ratio is to be maintained.
The Blue division commander could deal with this situation in a number of ways, but
in this example he must maintain his present defense and is considering providing
additional combat power to the brigade commander. The additional power can come
from several different types of units, and the division commander must decide which
unit or combination of units to employ. At this point the brigade has an artillery
battalion in direct support to it. The division commander wants to know if the
remainder of the divisional artillery that is uncommitted to missions of direct support
can decrease the power of the Red division by attacking it before time 60 and thus
prevent the power curves from crossing until time 65. Time 65 is the limit of the
forecast since it is the end of the brigade's area of interest. The asset commander, the
division artillery commander, will provide the answer to the explicit question and will
also answer the implied questions of what uncommitted units should be told to support
the brigade and what missions these units should be given.
The first part of the example will continue to develop the scenario by detailing
the information the algorithm uses in the example. The second part will step through
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Figure 4.1 Blue Brigade and Red Division Power Curves.
B. EXPLICIT INPUT VALUES
The time available for the asset commander to decrease the power of the Red
division is the time beginning immediately and ending when the Red division power
curve crosses the Blue brigade power curve. This time interval could be further
reduced by the amount of time necessary to notify his units to begin engaging the Red
targets. In this example it is assumed that the Blue units are in position and can begin
to engage the Red targets as soon as the allocation scheme is determined. There is no
delay for notification. The term "timeframe" will be used in the example to denote the
time from tQ to tr. Timeframe will also be used in the retrogressive sense. Since the
differential game is solved from the terminal condition, where t=t^ and t = 0, the
algorithm times will actually be the retrogressive time, T.
The uncommitted assets available to the Blue force are two Field Artillery
battalions, Xj and X . X
}
has eighteen (18) howitzers and X 2 has twenty-four (24).




are motorized rifle regiments. Yj and Y
2
have been fighting the Blue covering
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force and the forward defensive battalions. Y 3 and Y4 , a tank regiment, are in the Red
second echelon and are approaching the defensive line. Y5 is a logistics unit bringing
supplies to Yj and Y2> When these units are resupplied, they will regain the power lost
in the initial engagements. The power of the Red and Blue units at the present time
and at the end of the time period, tp are given in Table I.
TABLE I
SITUATIONAL INHERENT POWER FOR RED AND BLUE
Entity Entity Type SIP(t ) SIP(t^t )
400X
l
Blue artillery battalion 1500
X
2
Blue artillery battalion 1800 600
Y
l
Red motorized rifle regt. 1800 2970
Y
2
Red motorized rifle regt. 2200 3696
Y
3
Red motorized rifle regt. 3600 6188
Y
4
Red tank regiment 3500 6006
Y
5
Red logistics unit 1200 2059
The SIP of the Blue units at tris the minimum power level for those units that is
acceptable at the end of the timeframe to the asset commander. The SIP of the Red
units at t^ is the power those units will possess if they are unopposed until that time.
This is found using the forecasting methods of the Generalized Value System.
The Blue division commander has determined that to maintain the defense, the
power of the Red division must be decreased at tp by 2000 STAPOWs. The sum of the
power of the units of the Red force is the total Red power. The assumption that the
power of the parent unit is the sum of power of its components does not account for
any synergistic forces. These could be included if a form for their representation is
found that satisfies the user. The amount of the total power decrease, 2000 STAPOWs,
is to be distributed among the component units of the Red force.
The method for distributing the power decrease can take several forms. The
primary criteria for selecting a distribution method is that it must closely approximate
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the power losses that will be assessed by the differential game. If the method used
distributes the losses in some manner that does not approximate the outcome of the
game, the resulting power levels for the Red units will not conform to the actual
situation as they approach the initial surface. The method used in this example begins
by determining for each Blue unit the best target at t = and the best ammunition to
fire at that target. The length of time that this ammunition is fired is calculated, based
on the rate of fire and the quantity of ammunition available. The power decrease
achieved is then calculated by multiplying the Red unit power by the Blue unit power,
the attrition coefficient, and the length of time that the ammunition can be fired. If this
power decrease is greater than or equal to the amount needed by the force commander,
no further attrition of power is needed. If not, the power decrease is subtracted from
the Red unit SIP. The SIP's of the other Red units are recalculated for the change in
time using the GVS equations. Since the first type of ammunition has been expended,
another must be selected for each target type. This changes the attrition coefficients
and the best target-firer combinations. With a new ammunition type, the length of time
it can be fired must be computed as before, then a power decrease for the best target is
computed. The power decrease is added to that previously achieved and the sum is
compared with the amount needed. The process is continued iteratively until the power
decrease achieved is equal to the amount necessary. As each power decrease is
calculated, it is subtracted from the SIP of the Red unit selected. The result is then the
power level of the Red unit at T = 0. The two columns of Table II show the power of
the Red units at tr without the power decrease and with the power decrease applied in
the manner described.
The asset commander needs to know where the Red units are located since he
will only be able to attack those that are within range of his weapons. In this case, all
of the enemy targets are within range of both of the artillery units.
The ammunition available to the artillery units is of four types. For each type,
the amount and the attrition coefficient are given in Appendix A. The attrition
coefficients are related to the ammunition, not the firing unit. The unit represents the
weapon system and the assumption made is that the attrition coefficient is dependent
on the ammunition fired, not the weapon system firing it. In this example, the only
ammunition available to the units is that which is on hand in the units at tQ .
The ammunition in each unit represents a fraction of that unit's power. In this
example, the ammunition in Blue unit Xj represents fifty percent (50%) of the power
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TABLE II
POWER OF RED UNITS AT Tp
















of the unit and in X
2
it represents sixty percent (60%). The rate of fire for the
weapons system in X, is two rounds in three minutes and in X
2
the rate of fire is one
round in two minutes.
The determination of the amount of damage the Blue units will suffer in making
their attacks requires the assignment of attrition coefficients to the Red units also.
These coefficients are shown in Appendix A. The algorithm also needs to know which
Red units return fire against the Blue units. A counter is used in the algorithm to count
the number of time periods in which a Red unit is selected to be a target by each Blue
unit. When the ratio of the counter to the total number of elapsed time periods exceeds
a given constant, in this example 0.4, the Red unit is assumed to have located its
attacker. If the Red unit is going to return fire against the Blue unit, it is allowed to do
so. If the ratio is less than the constant, the Red unit is prevented from returning fire
by the assumption that it has not had sufficient opportunity to acquire the attacker.
This device is only used in the example. In the actual implementation in ALARM, the
detection of Blue units by Red units will be governed by a detailed subroutine that is
part of the thesis of CPT Rob Lindstrom [Rcf. 9].
The final items of information needed by the algorithm are the rate of
increase/decrease in power of each unit as time advances, and the time t
a
that
represents, for each unit, the time when it reaches its maximum value. The rate of
power increase/decrease is D, the exponential rate required by the Generalized Value
System. In the example, since the Blue units are in position and can engage targets, it
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is assumed that their t
a
has already passed. The power of these units can only remain
constant or decrease during the timeframe under consideration. If a unit does not
engage any targets, its power remains constant. If it attacks targets, its power
decreases. The Red units Yj and Y
2
have been attacking for an undisclosed period of
time and have suffered some power attrition. Their t
a
is still in the future so their
power will increase as they get closer to t
a
and as the Red logistics unit gets closer to




are still approaching the main defense area and have not
yet started their attacks, so their t
a
is in the future. Red unit Y
5
is also still
approaching and has not yet reached its x. . Table III gives the values for power rates
and values of t„.
a
TABLE III























Rate of Power Change is in units of hour .
C. ALGORITHM STEPS
The time step used in the example is one hour. Care must be taken to adjust all
rate parameters to this scale. The first step in the algorithm is to make feasibility
checks on range to targets and on ammunition. In this case, all five Red units are
within range for both Blue units. The rate of fire for Xj and'X
2
is .667 and .5 rounds
per minute, respectively. Multiplying this by the number of howitzers in each unit
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yields the result that both units must have seven hundred twenty (720) rounds of an
ammunition type for that type to be a candidate for firing in the next hour. There is
enough of every type ammunition except type four (4) in both Blue units (Appendix A,
Table VIII).
The next step in the algorithm is to select the attrition coefficient the unit will
use in the next time step. Having determined the candidate ammunition types in the
preceding step, the algorithm now sorts the attrition coefficients of the candidate
ammunition types and selects the largest one for each firer-target combination. The
result is a vector of five attrition coefficients for each Blue unit. Recall that these steps
are not necessary for Red units, which already have an attrition coefficients for each
Blue unit. The attrition vectors for Blue firers versus Red units are shown in Table IV




1 2 3 4 5
X
l
.00009 .00009 .00009 .00005 .000085
X
2
.00009 .00009 .00009 .00005 .000085
Attrition Coefficient Units are Red STAPOW/(Red STAPOW present)(Bluc
STAPOW)(hour)
The next step is to determine the optimal firer-target combinations for the next
hour. In Chapter Three, Section B, Subsection Five, the formula for the Main
Equation led to the criteria for optimal combinations. For each Blue unit i and for all
Red units j, every possible product Wj*a-*Y: is formed and the j that results in the
maximum value is the target for the next time step. For each Red unit j and all Blue
units i, every possible product Vj*P"*X- is formed and the i that results in the
minimum value is the next target. Thus the optimal pairing of firers and targets for
each side of the battle is made. The optimal firer-target combinations for the start of




























Selection of the target for each Blue unit provides the necessary information to
determine the power lost due ammunition expenditure. When the target is selected the
actual attrition coefficient for the next hour is specified. The attrition coefficient is
related to the ammunition to be fired so the type of ammunition is selected.
Multiplying the total ammunition power by the ratio of selected ammunition quantity
to total ammunition quantity, then dividing by the quantity of selected ammunition
(with a user-selected weighting factor for ammunition importance included) results in
the power of one round of the selected type. This is multiplied by the number of
rounds to be fired by the unit in one hour to determine the power loss due to
ammunition expenditure. The power loss due to ammunition expenditure in one hour
is 10.58 STAPOWs for Xj and 16.61 STAPOWs for Xr
With the information from the preceding steps, the differential game portion of
the algorithm is solvable. There are fourteen simultaneous differential equations that
are solved using the Subroutine DGEAR from the International Mathematics and
Scientific Library (IMSL).
The output from the differential game is in Table VI. It shows that the Blue units
need seven (7) hours to achieve the desired power decrease. The attacks start at the
fifty-third hour (t = 53 or X = 7). Both Blue units fire on Red unit Y5 , the logistics
unit. Blue unit X
2
shifts its fire at 57.352 hours to Red unit Y
3




until 57.888 hours, then shifts its fire to Y3 . The power levels of the Blue












































The asset commander now has a solution to allocating his resources against the
enemy targets. The asset commander decides to assign tactical missions to X. and X
2
based on the amount of time needed to achieve the attrition. The units required seven
out of a possible sixty hours to accomplish the goal and he recommends that the units
be given a General Support mission. If, for example, they had needed forty out of the
sixty hours to reach the goal, he might recommend a mission assignment of
Reinforcing.




at the time the attacks begin are critical to the
process. The method used to determine their starting values for the retrogressive solver
only yields an approximate answer. Working backwards to find the optimal allocations
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requires a rule for stopping the attrition when the power levels of the targets are within
an acceptable £ of the levels that would be achieved without the attrition. In the
example, the attrition is stopped when the sum of the power levels with attrition is
within four hundred (400) STAPOWs of the sum of the power levels without attrition.
In this example, the selection of the firer-target combinations is the same for
both Blue units. This is a predictable outcome because the Blue units are very similar.
The units have exactly the same type of ammunition, as indicated by the ammunition
attrition coefficients in Appendix A, Table IX. This coefficient becomes one of the
terms in the Equation 3.28
,
which is used to select the best target for each firer as
explained in Chapter 3, Section B, Subsection 5. The coefficients change when an
ammunition type is expended and a new type must be fired. In this case X2 fires on Y3
for a longer time than Xj because there is more of ammunition type three available to
X,. When those two ammunition types are expended the Blue units find better results
with their remaining ammunition attacking Y
5
.
The example demonstrates that the algorithm provides a workable solution to the
allocation problem. The formulation of the scenario led to a predictable outcome. The
use of very similar ammunition types and amounts resulted in allocations that were
essentially equal. Target selection is intuitively satisfactory. The rule used to select the
initial power level of the Red units to solve the differential game was tested in another
case and worked equally well there. The solution to the algorithm can be applied to the
problem of determining mission assignments or to a more basic scheduling of firers
against targets.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
An algorithm for solving a problem of continuing military importance has been
developed. The allocation process for asset-target combinations was analyzed. The
motivations for initiating a decisionmaking process were reviewed, and the goal of the
decisionmaker was postulated. The Field Artillery was chosen as an asset for
consideration, and the factors that influence the selection of asset-target combinations
in this particular functional area were considered. An algorithm was formulated based
on these factors and the method of differential games was selected as the optimizing
method in the algorithm. The parameters and equations for solving the differential
game were developed and the output from the game was used to make mission
assignments. Finally, an example was formulated and executed using the algorithm.
The example shows that the algorithm is capable of solving the allocation
problem in the type of scenario postulated. Further evaluation of the results using a
broad range of situations is necessary to establish full confidence in the algorithm. The
algorithm should apply equally well to other asset types, such as attack helicopters or
ground support aircraft. These are other variations that should be explored.
The algorithm seems very sensitive to the value of the state variables and the
values of other constants. It was observed during test runs that a change of one unit of
power in a Red unit was sometimes enough to alter the solution significantly. If this
continues to be true, the points were this occurs should be identified. There may be
inherent properties of the Kinematic or Path equations that are not yet known that
cause this effect. It is very possible that the combinations of these functions lead to
irregular surfaces that may be discontinuous at some points. Further use may also
require that the technique be implemented with control variables having values
between zero and one, not just those two points.
The Value of the differential game in the algorithm was selected to be the time
required to decrease Red's power. The Value is an expression dependent upon the
decisionmakers being modeled. The expression used in the algorithm may not reflect
the goals of every decisionmaker. In other situations the goal of the Blue force
commander might be to maximize the decrease in Red's power in a given timeframe. A
new expression for the Value of the game would need to be developed in such a case
because clearly time is a constraint, not a part of the objective function.
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Algorithms using differential games seem to be very applicable in the ALARM
model because of their ability to treat time continuously and to treat both players as
rational decisionmakers. Value expressions can be developed for generic situations or
can be designed for specific asset planning. Their application to solving allocations of
artillery, close air support, and similar assets in the planning stages of the model

























1 .00002 .00004 .000015 .00005 .00007
2 .000065 .00005 .000025 .000045 .000085
3 .00009 .000085 .00009 .00002 .00004
4 .000082 .00009 .000075 .00003 .000055
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TABLE IX
ATTRITION COEFFICIENTS FOR RED UNITS























DEFINITIONS OF POWER TERMS
The Basic Inherent Power (BIP(X-)) is the inherent power possessed by an entity
X- at full strength, when it is in position to engage its most likely adversary as a direct
result of X-'s ability to conduct combat operations.
The Adjusted Basic Inherent Power (ABIP(5A"
;
{t))) of an entity X- at time, t, is
the BIP of X- adjusted for the specific mission and condition of the entity at time t.
The Predicted Adjusted Basic Inherent Power (PABIP(X
i
(t)|5Ar/T ))) of an
entity X- at time, t
,
is the ABIP that X- is predicted to have at time, t (t> t ).
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APPENDIX C
FORTRAN 77 CODE FOR ALGORITHM
' Variable Definitions:
N: The number of differential equations to be solved.
Y(1),Y(2): The Blue force state variables (SIP).
Y(3)-Y(7): The Red force state variables (SIP).
Y(8),Y(9): The derivatives of the Value function w.r.t. the Blue
state variables.
Y(10)-Y(14): The derivatives of the Value function w.r.t. the Red
state variables.
YP(3)-YP(7): The PABIP of the Red force units.
UNITRT(i): The rate of fire for Blue unit i.
OH(i,k): The quantity of ammunition type k available in Blue unit i
TOH(i): The total quantity of ammunition available in Blue unit i.
NTUBE(i): The total number of weapons in Blue unit i.
TKIL(j,k): The attrition of Red unit j caused by ammunition type k.
BETA(j,i): The attrition of Blue unit i caused by Red unit j.
DR(j): The GVS rate of power change of Red unit j.
TA(1): The time that a unit will reach its maximum SIP.
The first two Commons, DBAND and GEAR, are needed when using DGEAR as
the differential equation solver.
COMMON/DBAND/NLC,NUC
COMMON/GEAR/DUMMY( 48) , SDUMMY( 4) , IDUMMY( 38)
The variables listed in the COMMON statements that have not been defined are
defined in the subroutines.
COMMON /0NE/BETA(5,2),PSn5.2),PHI(2,5) JFLAG(l) JCHG(1),KFUG(1)




COMMON/FI VE/DR( 51 , tAf i
)
COMMON/SIX/DETiND(5,2),JFLAG(l),TPHI(5,2),DFLAG(l)




The EXTERNAL command is required for DGEAR.
EXTERNAL PRYM.PPRYM
0PEN(UNIT=8,FiLE= l Dl l
OPENf UNIT=9 , FI LE= ' D2
'
0PEN(UNIT=2 FILE= BEST )






Y(l) AND Y(2) ARE THE SIP FOR XI AND X2.
SIP FOR Yl THROUGH Y5. Y(8) AND Y(9) ARE
Y(10) THROUGH Y(14) ARE THf
Y(3)
. THE VALUES OF
VALUES FOR Wl THROUGH W5.





























THE VALUES YP(I) ARE THE PABIP USED FROM THE GVS METHODOLOGY, BUT THEY




























































































































This is the start of the loop that provides solutions to the differential game at every
time increment (hour).
DO 10 P=l. ,60.






DO 440 I0LD=1 A 2
WRITE(8,450) iOLD,(PHI( IOLD .J0LD) ,J0LD=1 ,5)




CALL DGEAR(N,PRYM,PPRYM, TIM, DT,Y, TEND, TOL,METH, MITER, INDEX, IWK,
11 11/ TCD \ -
IFtlER . GT. 128)PRINT *, ' IER GREATER THAN 128'
WRITEC8.600) TIM.WI), 1=1 ,14) ,IDUMMY(7)
600 FORMAT(1X,F7.4/,7F10.37,7F10.6/VNSTEP = \I5)
If the solver has advanced at least one hour, it calls SUBROUTINE DELTA which
checks the difference in Red power levels with and without attrition. If the total
difference is small enough, it stops the Main.
IF (TIM .GE. 1.0)CALL DELTA(Y,TIM,YP,TDIFF)
IF(TDIFF .LE. 400.JTHEN
WRITE(8,9Q1) TIM,WLM+2),LM=1.5),TDIFF
901 FORMAT(iX,'YDELTA ACHIEVED Aj TIME P ,F6.2/,5(F9.3,2X)/,'TDI
IFF ' ,F9. 2/)
GO TO 35
END IF
This is the end of the loop for P.
10 CONTINUE
35 DO 810 JN=1,5
DO 820 IN=1,2






This subroutine creates matrices of PHI and PSI filled with zeros.On the first pass it
also fills a matrix called TPHI with zeros. This matrix counts the number of times a
Blue unit fires on a Red unit and is used for detection and counterfire determination.
After the first pass, JFLAG(l) is changed to 1 and TPHI isn't filled again.
PHI is Blue's control variable and PSI is Red's control variable.
C0MM0N/SIX/DETINDC5,2) AJFLAG(1),TPHI(5,2),DFLAG(1)
REAL A(2.5], B(5,2) ,D(5,2)
DO 10 1=1 ,
2








This subroutine determines the optimal firer-target combinations. ISTAR (j) is the
best target for each Red unit, and JSTAR(i) is the best target for each Blue unit.
VLO(j) and WHI(i) are arbitrary values.
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COMMON /ONE/BETA 5,2), PSI(5.2).PHI(2, 5), IFLAG(l) ,TCHG(1) ,KFLAG(1)
COMMON/FOUR/ALFAC2:5] IBE$T(2.$).A(2 4 }!C(21
COMMON/SIX/DETIND(5,2 J.JFLAG(i) tPfll(5 ,2) DFLAG(l)
INTEGER ISTAR(5). J$TAR(2)
REAL VLO(5),WrlI(2),Y(14),MIN,MAX
IF (IFLAG(l) . EQ. 0)CALL CMPAIR(TIM)
IF (IFLAG(l) • EQ. 0)CALL AMMO(ALFA,lBEST,A)
The first part of the routine finds the best Blue target for each Red firer by finding













The PS I matrix is now determined. To incorporate a detection process in the
counterfire Blue receives, the next portion resets a PSI value from 1.0 to 0.0 if the
detection indicator (DETIND(j,i) does not exceed an arbitrary value. DETIND(j,i) is
computed in SUBROUTINE CMPAIR.
DO 730 J=l,5
DO 740 1=1*2
IFCPSI(J,I) -EQ. 1.0 .AND. DETIND(J.I) . LT. . 4)PSI(J,I)=0.
740 CONTINUE
730 CONTINUE
The next part finds the best target for each Blue firer by finding the largest value of










To keep the program from allocating when a unit is out of ammunition,
the if statement sets PHI to when no ammunition is left.










This subroutine is called by DGEAR. It evaluates the derivatives of Y(l)-Y(14)—the
Kinematic and Path equations. YPRYM(i) is the derivative of Y(i) with respect to
time. It often occurs that DGEAR will call this subroutine multiple times before












CALL STAR ( ISTAR, JSTAR.Y, TIM)
CALL CMPAIR(TIM)
79 F0RMAT(F9.6/.2(5(F4. 2,1X)/))
DO 120 K=l A tf






























































This subroutine determines the amount of power expended by Blue units in firing
ammunition, C(i). It also counts the ammunition expended and updates the OH(i,k)
and TOH(i) quantities and the TAP(i) available.
REAL Y(14)
N(i) is the number of rounds fired in the time step taken by DGEAR. The time step































This subroutine passes three items back to the Main. It determines the a matrix,
picks the best ammunition type to fire at each possible target, and determines the
power of each round of each ammunition type. ALFA is the matrix of attrition
coefficients for all firer-target pairs. I BEST is the best ammunition to fire at each
possible target. 'A' is the matrix of ammunition power per round in each Blue unit.
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C0MM0N/THREE/UNITRT(2) ,0H(2,4) ,TKIL(5,4) ,TAP(2) ,T0H(2) ,NTUBE(2)
,
1DTIM(1)
FIRE(i) is the number of rounds Blue unit i fires in 60 minutes. AVAIL(i,k) is a





The routine compares the quantity of ammunition on hand (OH) with the quantity
the unit will fire in the next hour. If OH is large enough, that type becomes a
candidate for firing and the attrition coefficient for round k against target j is passed
into AVAIL(I.K).
DO 210 J=l,5
DO 220 K=l 4






Now the ammunition types available in each Blue unit i are sorted to find the one
that gives the maximum attrition against Red target j. The attrition coefficient for this
one becomes the attrition coefficient for the Blue unit. IBEST(i,j) is determined













The 'A(i,k)' matrix is now created. For each ammunition type, the OH quantity is
divided by the TOH quantity. The result is multiplied by the fraction of the unit power
represented by ammunition, TAP. This is then the fraction of TAP represented by each
ammunition type, KTAP. KTAP is then divided by the OH quantity to get the amount






















This is a dummy subroutine. It must be used to evaluate the Jacobian matrix in






This subroutine checks the strategy for each Blue unit and reports if the strategy has
changed. It also computes the detection indicator DETIND(j,i).
COMMON/ONE/BETA(5,2) A PSI(5 J 2).PHI('2,5),IFLAG(l),TCHG(l),KFLAG(l)
C0MM0N/SIX/DETIND(5^).JFLAG(i),TPHt(b,2),DFLAG(l)
C0MM0N/GEAR/DUMMY(4S),SDUMMY(4),IDUMMY(385
PASTl(i) is a matrix used as an interchange in this routine only.
DIMENSION PAST1(2,5)
IF (IFLAG(l)
. EQ. 0) GO TO 280
KFLAG(1)=0
DO 290 IC=1,2
DO 330 JC=1 A 5




If the solver has taken a step forward in time and the strategy for a Blue unit has
changed, the subroutine reports it here.
IF(TCHGfl) .NE. TIM)THEN
IF(KFLAGU) .NE. 1)G0 TO 701
DO 700 INEW=1,2
WRITE(8,601) iNEW,TCHG,(PHI(INEW,JNEW).JNEW=1.5)
601 FORMAT ( 2X\ 'STRATEGY^ FOR BLUE', 1 1,
1 CHANGED AT TIME ' ,F6. 3/,5(F4
1 .2.1XJ)
700 conYinue
The subroutine increments DFLAG(l) because time has advanced, and adds
PHI(i,j) to TPHI(i,j). It then determines DETIND(j,i), the ratio of the number of times










Before exiting the routine, PHI(i,j) values are passed to PASTl(i,j).















This subroutine measures the difference between the power levels of the Red units
with and without attrition. It sums the difference for all of the units and passes this
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